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Introduction
Conatus (“striving”) is a specific concept within Descartes’s physics. In particular, it assumes a
crucial importance in the purely mechanistic description of the nature of light – an issue that Des-
cartes considered one of the most crucial challenges, and major achievements, of his natural phil-
osophy. According to Descartes’s cosmology, the universe – understood as a material continuum
in which there is no vacuum – is composed of a number of separate yet interconnected vortices.
Each of these vortices consists in a set of bands rotating around their centres. The bands are com-
posed of corpuscles of the three elements, each distinguished on the basis of their different shapes
and sizes. The small globules of the second element (of which the heavens are mainly composed),
although impeded by the other parts of heaven, strive to move away from the centre of the vortex
around which they revolve, thus exerting a certain force against the surrounding bodies. This
striving or conatus, though a mere force rather than a genuine motion, is transmitted instan-
taneously and along straight lines from body to body. According to Descartes, then, the nature
of light consists in this striving alone.
This account must be understood as strictly connected to the fundamental laws that regulate
the Cartesian world. It is particularly important to recall that for Descartes the centrifugal force
exerted by a rotating body is understood to be a consequence of the intrinsic rectilinearity of
every motion. As the second of the three Laws of Nature set forth in Book II of the Principles
of Philosophy establishes, “all motion is in itself rectilinear; and hence any body moving in a
circle tends to move away from the centre of the circle which it describes (“tendere semper ut
recedat a centro circuli quem describunt”) as proved by the fact that a stone rotating in a sling
tends to move centrifugally along the tangent of each point described by a circle.1 Similarly,
each of the globules of the second element “strives to recede with a great force from the centre
of the vortex in which it rotates; it is in fact prevented by the other globules placed all around,
not differently than a stone in a sling”.2 Within this framework, as I show later, conatus occurs
when a body’s intrinsic tendency to rectilinear motion is impeded by an external constraint.3
As Stephen Gaukroger notes, the use of the term conatus in the Principles – like “vis” and
“action” – shows that Descartes “cannot avoid dynamic terminology”, despite his declared
intent “to construe motion in a purely kinematic way”. Indeed, Gaukroger observes that the
notions of force (vis) action (actio) and striving (conatus) are systematically employed in the
Principles – appearing 290, 59 and 8 times, respectively.4 Also noteworthy, conatus was –
together with the more familiar concepts of actio and vis – a significant element of the conceptual
apparatus of Scholastic natural philosophy. As will be seen later – and this is the first goal of this
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paper – here the concept of conatus had a very specific function. Indeed, it was a central part of the
Aristotelian-Scholastic account of gravitation. Conatus was used to refer to the striving of a body
to move towards its natural place – especially in cases where its natural motion was hindered or
impeded by an external mover.
This specific use of the concept of conatus can be found in texts on natural philosophy from the
end of the sixteenth through the late seventeenth century. Notably, it occurs in some of the late-Scho-
lastic texts which held special significance for Descartes’s thought. Therefore, Descartes introduces
conatus in a context in which this concept already had a very specific meaning, and one of which he
was very probably aware. The possible relations between these two apparently very different con-
cepts have therefore to be scrutinized. I therebypropose to undertake a comparisonbetween the Scho-
lastic and the Cartesian conceptions of conatus. I hope to show that certain traits of the former are
indeed echoed by the latter, although adapted to the much changed physical paradigm of Cartesian
physics.5 In fact, Descartes’s conatus, though sharing some important similarities with the old one,
underwent significant transformations in terms of both its meaning and its application. However, I
hope to show that these concepts are both used to describe the behaviour of bodies in relation to
their intrinsic motive tendency, and in particular when this tendency is impeded or prevented.
Such a reconstruction offers two main areas of interest. On an immediate level, it furthers the
general efforts of scholars over the past decades to reconstruct the full extent of the relations
between Descartes’s thought and Scholastic philosophy. However, there is another significant
reason for taking an interest in the ties between the Scholastic and the Cartesian conceptions
of conatus. Indeed, the Cartesian conatus must be seen as crucial to a proper understanding of
the broader, diverse conceptualization that this idea enjoyed in the thought of many of the
most important philosophers of the early modern period, namely Spinoza, Hobbes and
Leibniz. In particular, Spinoza (and probably Hobbes too), were directly influenced by Descartes
in their unique formulations of conatus. Thus a reconstruction of the context in which Descartes
formulated his conatus and of its relations to a pre-existing Scholastic conception will enable us to
better reconstruct the history of this idea in the early modern period.
The paper is structured as follows: in the first part, I provide a thorough review of the Scho-
lastic employment of the concept conatus – both its meaning and the extent of its usage. I then
show that it occurs in some of the most prominent Cartesian sources. Finally, I shall provide
an account of Descartes’s theory of circular motion and conatus with the specific aim of empha-
sizing the elements of both continuity and discontinuity that justify the claim that Descartes’s con-
ception of conatus is reminiscent of the Scholastic one.
Conatus in scholastic physics
As is well known, one of the bases of Aristotelian physics consisted in the crucial distinction
between “natural” and “violent” motions. In a notorious passage of his Physics, Aristotle
argued that:
upward locomotion belongs naturally to fire and downward to earth, and the locomotions of the two
are certainly contrary to each other. And again, fire moves up naturally and down unnaturally; and its
natural motion is certainly contrary to its unnatural motion. Similarly with remaining: remaining
above is contrary to motion from above downwards, and to earth this remaining comes unnaturally,
this motion naturally. So the unnatural remaining of a thing is contrary to its natural motion, just as we
find a similar contrariety in the motion of the same thing: one of its motions, the upward or the down-
ward, is natural, the other unnatural.6
All sublunary motions eventually culminate in a state of rest, rest being the natural state of
every thing. In this theoretical framework, “natural” motion was understood as the one directing
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a thing to its natural place or sphere. Heavy bodies were thought to “gravitate” by falling recti-
linearly towards the centre of the earth. Levitation – although in late-Scholasticism often under-
stood as a mere by-product of gravitation – occurs in light bodies (such as fire), which are
attracted upwards to their natural sphere. On the other hand, “violent” motion was understood
as any motion imparted by an external mover that displaced a body from its state of rest, or
that forced the body to assume a motion whose direction diverted it from its rectilinear, natural
motion towards the centre of the earth. Gravitas and levitas were understood as resulting from
the form of the body or to the form of the elements composing it.7
The obscurity of the causes of gravitation often resulted in these phenomena being described
in language which was associated with animate beings. Psychological terms, for example, were
employed systematically, albeit analogically, to describe natural phenomena, such as those of levi-
tation of gravitation. For instance, the relations of attraction or repulsion between inanimate enti-
ties were often described in terms of “desire” or “aversion”. A good example of this is the use of
the term “appetite” (appetitus). For instance, Aquinas, in his Summa contra Gentiles (probably
written in 1264) distinguishes three possible uses of the term:
there is in everything an appetite for the good: for good is what everything desires [appetuntur], as the
philosophers teach. In this way, the appetite in the things that lack thought is called natural appetite, as
for instance it is said that the stone desires [appetit] to be downwards. In those who have sensitive
thought, it is called animal appetite, which is divided into concupiscible and irascible. In those
who have intelligence, it is called intellectual or rational appetite, which is will.8
Similarly, the entry for appetitus in Goclenius’s Lexicon Philosophicum (1613) distinguishes
three proper usages (naturalis appetitus, animalis appetitus and appetitus naturae intelligentis &
voluntariae). Goclenius himself underlines the “ambiguous nature of the term”, pointing out that
there is said to be an “appetite” of “fire to occupy the superior places, of the iron to conjoin with
the magnet; of plants to absorb lymph, of horses to venery, of men to beatitude”.9 Naturalis appe-
titus – a usage that Goclenius describes as somewhat inappropriate10 – applies both to “plants who
attract toward themselves and desire aliments without sensibility”,11 and to “inanimate things,
such as the magnet”.12 In the jargon of late Scholastic physics, then, appetitus is a well-estab-
lished concept, specifically employed to describe a thing’s attraction towards its natural place.
The awareness of the psychological connotation of the term did not cause any reluctance in
respect of its use. Rather, it raised the need for further clarification in certain instances. Francesco
Buonamici, in his De Motu (1587) to give one example, justified the somewhat “metaphorical”
use of the term appetitus by providing a general definition of it as the “inclination which is necess-
ary from the nature of every thing to agree to the good that convene to itself according to
nature”.13
Conatus – a word that in Latin signifies “striving” and therefore has anthropomorphic or
psychological connotations – was a part of this lexicon. Indeed, as mentioned, the concept of
conatus was a central part of the Scholastic account of gravitation. Every sublunary body has a
tendency to return to its natural place through a rectilinear motion towards the centre of its
sphere. Whenever it is displaced from its natural place, or, in particular, whenever its natural
motion towards the centre of its sphere is impeded or hindered by an external, violent motion,
the body exerts a force. This force was interpreted as a genuine striving to move towards the
body’s natural place; to put it differently, a body’s effort to move according to its intrinsic
motive tendency. It is important to note that conatus was not understood as actual motion, but
simply as a striving to move.
One could provide many examples of the peculiar use of this concept. For one, William
A. Wallace, in his Prelude to Galileo, recalls the concise definition of conatus provided by the
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Jesuit scholar and apologist Muzio Vitelleschi in his lectures on Aristotle’s Physics.14 Vitelleschi
addressed himself to one of the vexatae quaestiones of Scholastic gravitational theory, that is,
whether heavy or light bodies gravitate or levitate in their own spheres. As Wallace recalls,
to answer this Vitelleschi notes that natural motive powers have three different effects: (1) they
move to a proper place when nothing impedes them; (2) they provide a certain tendency [quidam
conatus] to motion if something impedes them; and (3) they keep the element in its proper place,
resisting any attempt to remove it therefrom. [… ] Vitelleschi’s position is that if by gravitation
is understood the element’s remaining in its proper place and resisting any effort to be removed
from it, then one can say that the elements gravitate within their own spheres. But if gravitation
is understood properly for a motion downward or for a conatus to such motion, then the elements
do not gravitate – a fact that explains why we do not feel the weight of the air with which we are
surrounded.15
According to Vitelleschi, conatus occurs when the natural motive tendency of a body is
impeded. It is therefore the dynamic manifestation of the intrinsic kinetic tendency that each sub-
lunary body has towards its natural place. A similar understanding can be found in the Commen-
tari in Octo Libros Physicorum Aristotelis of the Jesuit Collegium Conimbricenses, first
published in 1592, but still very influential in the first decades of the seventeenth century (as
its numerous reprints attest). According to these Jesuit scholars, the violent motion impressed
on a stone by throwing it upwards gives rise to a striving in the stone to move by its natural
motion towards the centre of the earth. This striving can be seen as a force that actively
opposes the ascent of the stone.
every time a stone is thrust upwards by an external force, its form opposes the ascent by a natural
striving [conatu] and impulse that urges it downwards; but also the water, when warmed up by the
fire, repels actively this form of warmness, because of an innate tendency to cold, and to conserve
its coldness as much as it can, even in fire).16
As noted by Cees Leijenhorst, Eustachius a Sancto Paulo makes use of the notion of conatus in his
Summa (1626). From Eustachius’s accounts, it becomes evident that conatus is a force exerted by
a body to move naturally, but does not itself constitute motion. In fact, Eustachius carefully dis-
tinguishes the striving from the actual state of gravitating or levitating. He writes:
Wherever they are, the heavy bodies which are above light ones fall down [gravitant], as well as the
heavier which are over the less heavy ones. Similarly, the light bodies that are amongst heavy ones,
and the lighter ones amongst less light ones, rise. The truth of this claim is evident from experience:
indeed, everywhere heavy bodies are set down, immediately the light or less heavy ones, if they are
below, are carried up to a higher place. And this would not happen if it were not for the reciprocal
strivings [conatu] of the heavy bodies to descend, and of the light ones to ascend, which in act
[actu] are called gravitating and levitating.17
Similarly Francesco Buonamici, author of a famous treatise on motion (De Motu, written in
1587 and published in 1591) which is likely to have exerted some influence on the young Galileo
(who at the time was Buonamici’s pupil in Pisa) makes frequent use of the concept of conatus. For
instance, in Book V of De Motu, an exhaustive examination of violent motion, Buonamici
explains that the mover, in order to move a body, must first overcome the resistance of the
body to remain in a state of rest. In this case, the conatus of the body does not assist the
motion imparted by the mover in any way. Whereas the contrary applies when I throw a stone
downwards, since in this case the conatus contributes to the motion imparted by the external
mover:
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Thus everything opposes its destruction as much as it can; for this reason it is so far from accelerating,
that unless the force of the moving body were to exceed the resistance of the movable body, that body
would never move; and unless the violent faculty prevails, it would always come back to its previous
place; nor would it assist the striving of the moving body in any way, as it would with the stone, if they
let it fall with a great impetus.18
It is possible to find occurrences of this peculiar usage of the concept of conatus in the second
half of the seventeenth century. An example is found in the Tractatus de motu locali physicus
(1646) of the Jesuit mathematician Honoré Fabri. Fabri’s De motu, traditionally seen merely as
an example of the reaction of the late Scholastics to Galileo, has recently been re-evaluated to
shed light on the originality of its conception of impetus.19 In Book X, again devoted to
violent motion (understood by Fabri as opposed to natural motion, also called “formal motion”
since he conceives it as dependent upon the form of the body), he addresses a set of objections
against his theory of impetus, among which is that “when a hand bears a certain body motion-
lessly, it does not produce any impetus”.20 Fabri replies:
I answer that no impetus is in vain. And it may be that it lacks motion, as one can observe in this innate
impetus, whose effect is twofold: that is, gravitation and motion, as we have indicated elsewhere.
Similarly, the impetus produced by a motive power [… ] may have a twofold effect. The first
is motion; the second is an exertion [nisus] or striving [conatus] opposed to the extrinsic motion.
[… ] Indeed it always has this innate motion, unless it is hindered by another body [… ].21
What Fabri calls “extrinsic motion” (extrinsecus motus) is nothing but the effect of an external
mover that impedes the fulfilment of a body’s intrinsic motive tendency. This external hindrance
causes the body to exert a certain striving to move naturally.
Despite the fact that it is written in Italian, we also find an echo of the Scholastic con-
ception of conatus understood as a proof of the validity of Aristotle’s account of gravitation
in the Jesuit Stefano degli Angeli’s dialogue on gravity, Della gravita’ dell’ aria e fluidi eser-
citata principalmente nelli loro homogenei (1671). Since the form of a body determines its
gravity (that is, the force with which it is attracted towards the centre of his sphere) degli
Angeli argues that if the heaviness of a certain portion of matter is diminished, its conatus
will decrease proportionally. Therefore, it will be pushed upwards by the rest of matter that
has preserved its gravity intact:
A portion of this water or air shall be made in a certain way a bit less dense and heavy, so that its
striving to descend [il suo conato al discendere] diminishes partially; you will observe that it
would be immediately pushed upwards by that air, or water, that, being unaltered, keeps the same
conatus [conserua il medemo conato] that exceeds that of the rarefied [… ].22
Similarly, Giovanni Alfonso Borelli, in his De motionibus naturalibus a gravitate pendenti-
bus (1670), makes a systematic and frequent use of the term conatus, understood again as the
force exerted by a body when prevented from gravitating. This is indicative of the diffusion of
this particular use of the concept of conatus beyond the frame of Aristotelian physics. For
instance, in the second set of hypotheses in Book I – devoted to the motion of the sublunary
bodies in a fluid medium – Borelli writes that:
In the second place I suppose a force, or a striving [conatum] with which it strives to unite itself with
the terraqueous sphere, accomplished through a line straight in respect to the surface of the horizon.
And this is manifest since any body strives [conatur] with a natural instinct to reach the centre of earth
in the shortest way. Therefore the direction of the aforesaid motion, or compressive striving [conatus]
is produced along the semidiameters of the same earth, that is, those that are constructed on the
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horizontal surface, which enclose spherically the earth itself, and therefore is evident that motion or
the compressive striving of every part of the fluid is produced along lines perpendicular to the
horizon.23
This passage allows us to underline another important characteristic of the Scholastic conception
of conatus, namely its directional nature. Since heavy bodies are attracted to the centre of the
earth, their motion tends rectilinearly in that direction. Therefore, as Borelli clarifies, the
conatus of heavy bodies is oriented perpendicularly with respect to the horizon.
Conatus in Cartesian sources
It is hard to determine the origin of the concept of conatus within Scholasticism. However, it
seems at least possible to claim that its usage spreads especially among late Scholastic authors,
since I have not found any attestation of it in some of the most representative of the ancient
sources of Aristotelian natural philosophy.24 Its frequent (but not universal) occurrence in
Jesuit commentaries or treatises may suggest that this concept could have been developed
in this specific milieu, and then rapidly spread due to the pre-eminent role held by the
Jesuit order in the educational system of the time.25 It is also necessary to emphasize that,
despite its arguably wide diffusion, there was no fully systematic use of the conatus
concept in Scholastic natural philosophy, nor in the various systems of post-Scholastic
early modern physics.26
Whatever the origin of this concept might have been, it is certainly possible to argue that
Descartes was very likely familiar with at least two of the possible sources of the Scholastic
conception of conatus. In fact, both the Conimbricenses Commentaries on Aristotle’s works
and Eustachius’s Summa were likely adopted as textbooks at the Jesuit college of La Flèche
where Descartes was educated, or at least commonly circulated in that milieu. As Dennis Des
Chene has highlighted, Descartes himself recalled in a letter to Mersenne (30 September
1640)27 that he had read these texts during his youth, and he expressed his intention to
return to them in order to anticipate the possible objections of the Jesuits to his Meditations.28
Moreover, as Roger Ariew has noted29 in another letter to Mersenne (11 November 1640)
Descartes praises Eustachius’s “Philosophie” (probably referring to his Summa quadripartita)
as “the best book that has ever been written on this subject”. Descartes writes that he intends to
take it as a model for a publishing project, along with a “Cours de ma Philosophie en forme de
Theses”, of a “Cours de la Philosophie ordinaire”.30 It seems clear, then, that Descartes knew
Eustachius’s philosophy quite well, and some scholars have claimed that he was probably
influenced by it at least to a certain extent.31 By extension, therefore, it is quite feasible to
argue that Descartes was familiar with the Scholastic concept of conatus through these
sources.
Circular motion and conatus in Descartes’s physics
However, the fact that Descartes was probably aware of the use of conatus within Scholastic
natural philosophy does not allow per se any speculation on a possible influence of this
concept on Descartes’s own conception. On the contrary, the Scholastic conatus is prima facie
very far from Descartes, since it is tied to an account of gravitation that Descartes harshly criti-
cizes. Indeed, Cartesian physics is based precisely on a rebuttal of the Aristotelian account of
gravitation, and therefore on a refutation of the doctrine of natural places. Gravitation, in his
view, could not be ascribed to obscure, hylomorphic principles, nor described tautologically in
terms of attraction and appetite. As Descartes writes,
484 R. GARAU
Those who have not followed Aristotle [… ] have nevertheless been saturated with his opinions in
their youth (since they are the only opinions taught in the Schools) and this has so dominated their
outlook that they have been unable to arrive at knowledge of true principles. Although I respect all
these thinkers [… ] they have all put forward as principles things of which they did not possess
perfect knowledge. For example, there is no one of them, so far as I know, who has not supposed
there to be weight in terrestrial bodies. Yet although experience shows us very clearly that the
bodies we call ‘heavy’ descend towards the center of the earth, we do not for all that have any knowl-
edge of the nature of what is called ‘gravity’, that is to say, the cause or principle which make bodies
descend in this way, and we must derive such knowledge from some other sources.32
Bodies do not tend to any natural place, as to understand them as such is to rely on tautological
and obscure heuristic principles. Moreover, motion is not a contingent, teleologically oriented
state, taking place between an initial and eventual condition of rest (or, to put it as the Scholastics
did, having a terminus a quo and ad quem). On the contrary, Descartes’s physics is based on the
assumption that “God is the primary cause of motion; and He always preserves the same quantity
of motion in the universe.”33 From this follows a set of three laws, called by Descartes “Laws of
Nature”. The first of these laws is the exact overturning of the very basis of Aristotelian natural
philosophy. In fact, Descartes claims that “each and every thing, insofar as it can, always con-
tinues in the same state; and thus what is once in motion always continues to move”, as well
as to stay at rest and keep its shape.34
Therefore, the Scholastic and the Cartesian concepts of conatus are not only applied to differ-
ent phenomena, but are also deeply rooted in very different theoretical frameworks that make
them difficult to compare. However, as I shall show, both these concepts concern the explanation
of the intrinsic motive tendency of bodies, and in particular the description of the behaviour of
these bodies when their intrinsic motive tendency is impeded.
As we have seen, according to Descartes every motion is intrinsically rectilinear. Circular
motion, on the contrary, is the outcome of the combination of external constraints that hinders
the body from moving along a straight line. The second law (II, 39) as recalled, consists in the
establishment of rectilinearity as the only intrinsic determination of motion.35 Descartes claims
that “all motion is in itself rectilinear; and hence bodies moving in a circle always tend to
move away from the centre of the circle which they describe” (“tendere semper ut recedant a
centro circulo quem describunt”).36 The verb “tendere” which Descartes uses here is strictly con-
nected to the conatus concept. Indeed in his earlier work The World (originally written in French
between 1629 and 1633 but published posthumously in 1664), Descartes clarifies the use of the
verb “tendre” (“to tend)” which he uses in the explanation of the same law of nature (although
here it is his third, rather than his second law). “Tending” implies the idea of striving (“effort”,
the French equivalent of the Latin conatus) which is the consequence of a certain external resist-
ance.37 The expression “tendre”, says Descartes, implies that a body
is disposed to move there, whether it truly moves or, rather, some other bodies prevents it from doing
so. It is principally in this last sense that I use the word tend, because it seems to signify some effort
and because every effort presupposes some resistance [c’est principalement en ce dernier sens que je
me sers du mot de tendre, à cause qu’il semble signifier quelque effort, & que tout effort présupose de
la resistence]38
Immediately after, while explaining the nature of light as due to the striving of the corpuscles
of the second element in their rotation around their vortex, Descartes specifies that “the resistance
of other parts of heaven” against the rectilinear tendency of the corpuscles of the second element
causes them to move circularly and so to tend centrifugally, and that it is “the reason why they
make an effort to move (est cause qu’elles font effort pour se mouvoir’)”.39 The concept of ten-
dency therefore already implies a certain external constraint that opposes the intrinsic rectilinear
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inertia of a body, and at the same time the force that this body exerts to put into action the recti-
linear motion.40 Descartes’s conatus is, therefore, to be understood as a dynamic (rather than a
kinetic) expression of the intrinsic rectilinearity of motion. Indeed, conatus takes place when a
body is forced to move circularly, and therefore when its intrinsic rectilinearity of motion is pre-
vented – a condition that is to be considered as the norm in a continuum where there is no vacuum,
and where therefore bodies are in a state of perpetual mutual collision and constraint.
The intrinsic rectilinearity of motion is founded on the same metaphysical assumption as the
principle of the preservation of states established in the first law. As Descartes explains, it is due to
“the immutability and the simplicity of the operation by which God preserves motion in matter”.
Indeed,
[God] always preserves the motion in the precise form in which it is occurring at the very moment
when he preserves it, without taking any account of the motion which was occurring a little while
earlier. It is true that no motion takes place in a single instant of time; but clearly whatever is in
motion is determined, at the individual instants which can be specified as long as the motion lasts,
to continue moving in a given direction along a straight line, and never in a curve[… ].41
Figure 1. The centrifugal, tangential tendency of the stone rotating in a sling as represented by Descartes in
the Principles.
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Therefore, continues Descartes (see Figure 1)
the stone A, rotating through the circle ABF in the sling EA, in that instant, in which it is in the point
A, is determined to move toward a certain part namely along a straight line toward C, in such a way
that the straight line AC is the tangent of the circle. And one cannot pretend that it is determined to any
curved motion. Even if it previously arrived from L to A along a curved line, nothing however of this
bending can be understood to remain in it, while it is in the point A. And this is also confirmed by
experience since in the instant it leaves the sling, it does not continue to move toward B, but
toward C. From this, it follows that every body that is moved in a circle always tends to recede
[tendere ut recedat] from the centre of the circle that it describes.42
As Peter McLaughlin has underlined, Descartes’s three laws describe the behaviour of
bodies in the ideal (but we may also say merely theoretical) case of the “absence of inter-
actions”, or in the case in which “two otherwise isolated bodies [… ] interact with each
other – and only with each other” and are therefore “neither impeded nor assisted’ by sur-
rounding bodies”.43 In fact, since Descartes considers the res extensa as a continuum, in
which “each body is simultaneously in contact with many others”.44 How does the complexity
of nature harmonize with the simplicity of God’s action? In Le Monde, Descartes’s position is
very explicit: God’s action on nature is simple and constant. Therefore, the extreme complex-
ity of natural phenomena cannot be seen as the immediate result of his action; rather, they
must be attributed to nature:
by “nature” I do not here mean some deity or other sort of imaginary power. Rather, I use that word to
signify matter itself, insofar as I consider it taken together with all the qualities that I have attributed to
it, and under the condition that God continues to preserve it in the same way that He created it. From
that alone (i.e., that He continues thus to preserve it) it follows of necessity that there may be many
changes in its parts that cannot, it seems to me, be properly attributed to the action of God
(because that action does not change) and hence are to be attributed to nature. The rules according
to which these changes take place I call the “laws of nature”.45
And, a little further on, Descartes even adds that the variety of motions in nature is to be
understood as accidental:
with God always acting in the same way and consequently always producing the same effect in sub-
stance, there occur, as by accident [comme par accident] many diversities in that effect. And it is easy
to believe that God, who, as everyone must know, is immutable, always acts in the same way.46
In this light, curvilinear or circular motion cannot be interpreted as an immediate consequence of
God’s action on nature. The intrinsic tendency of moving bodies, indeed, is to maintain their recti-
linear motion. This tendency derives from the very action of God on nature. Curvilinear or circu-
lar motion is therefore a mediate consequence of this constant action of preservation, in other
words, a supervenience on the interaction of this simple and constant divine action with the
complex and chaotic essence of the extended substance. In fact, as Descartes puts it, “God
alone is the author of all the motions in the world, insofar as they exist and insofar as they are
straight, but it is the diverse disposition of matter that renders the motions irregular and
curved.”47 Surprisingly, Descartes even compares rectilinear tendency and human agency. He
writes:
the theologians teach us that God is also the author of all our actions, insofar as they exist and insofar
as they have some goodness, but it is the diverse disposition of our wills that can render those actions
evil.48
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As good actions are said to be dependent on God whereas evil actions depend on the limitations of
our will, so God can be considered responsible for the motion of a body only insofar as it takes
place along a straight line. It would be indeed not hard to glimpse here, in this account of recti-
linear inertia as an outcome of the simple action of God’s ordinary concourse on nature, an echo of
the Aristotelian distinction between natural and violent motion. Circular motion is always the
outcome, though indirect, of the fundamental kinetic behaviour of bodies. However, it is no
doubt that here Descartes intends to emphasize the difference between the intrinsic rectilinearity
of the motion of bodies and the various motions – and especially the circular ones – deriving from
the complex constitution of extended substance. In this account, circular motion must be con-
sidered as the outcome of a complex combination of multiple causes that act simultaneously
on the same body. As Descartes explains in III.57, a stone rotating in a sling effectively tends
to move circularly, but only “if we consider all the causes which go to determine its motion,
since it in fact goes in this direction”.49 In fact, if we abstract all the different determinations
that affect that stone – or, as Descartes puts it, “if we concentrate simply on the power of
moving which is in the stone itself” – we shall notice that it tends simultaneously to exert
from the rotating centre along a tangent described from each point of its circumference, and
from each of the radiuses of the same circumference. However, explains Descartes, “although
the sling prevents this effect, it cannot however prevent the striving” (“ac quamvis funda hunc
effectum impediat, non tamen impedit conatum”).50
The conatus is not a mere abstract determination, but is considered by Descartes to be an
actual force, so much so that he even understands it as measurable to a certain extent. Descartes
explains in the Principles (see Figure 2) that if we put a ball in a tube, then apply a circular motion
to the tube, we observe that the ball will move towards the extremity of the tube with increased
speed, since the initial force will be increased by the striving from the centre of the rotation:
in a first moment, in which this tube is put in rotation around the centre E, the ball A moves toward Y
only with a very slow movement; but in a second moment it goes on a bit quicker: in fact, it will retain
the previous force, and will then acquire a new one from a new striving to recede from the centre E.51
Figure 2. The tube rotates and the ball contained in it moves towards its extremity with increasing speed.
Another representation of the conatus offered by Descartes in the Principles.
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Similarly, Descartes observes that there is an increased tension in the cord which holds the pro-
jectile which corresponds to a faster rotational motion applied to the stone in a sling. Therefore,
“this tension, arising from the only force with which the stone strives to recede from the centre of
its motion shows us the quantity of this force”.52
Conclusions
In a famous passage in the Principles, Descartes clarifies that his use of the expression “striving”
does not entail any suggestion of animation:
when I say that the globules of the second element ‘strive’ to move away from the centres [recedere
conantur ab istis centris] around which they revolve, it should not be thought that I am implying that
they have some thought from which this striving proceeds. I mean merely that they are positioned and
pushed into motion is such a way that they will in fact travel in that direction, unless they are pre-
vented by some other causes (II, 56).53
The main aim of this passage was probably that of wiping out any possible charge of endor-
sing the animistic interpretation of natural phenomena that had characterized some of the most
important natural philosophies of the Italian Renaissance, such as those of Bruno, Patrizi and
Campanella. No less important, however, this clarification can be seen as a veiled polemic
against the ambiguous employment of psychological expressions that, as I have shown, charac-
terized Scholastic natural philosophy.
The very fact that Descartes uses the expression “recedere conantur ab istis centris” despite a
seeming dissatisfaction with its vaguely voluntaristic connotations, can be seen as evidence of the
fact this expression is taken from a pre-existing context in which it carried a highly specified
meaning that was relatively close to that which Descartes was looking for. Indeed, the Cartesian
conatus seems to be reminiscent of some traits of the Scholastic one. The Cartesian body, when
forced to move curvilinearly and so prevented from moving according to its rectilinear intrinsic
tendency – an expression of the simplicity of the divine ordinary concourse – strives to move in
that direction. In other words, the conatus manifests the intrinsic motive tendency of the body in
the presence of external resistance. According to the Scholastics, a sublunary body – especially
when it is prevented from moving naturally towards the centre of its sphere or when this natural
motive tendency is opposed by an extrinsic motion – strives to move in that direction. A conatus –
which again is not motion but merely a striving towards motion – manifests this intrinsic motive
tendency of the body. Moreover, both the Scholastic and the Cartesian conatus are not actual
motion but forces (although we have to take into account the very different meaning that this
implied in their respective conceptual frameworks), and both are exerted rectilinearly (although
the former tends in a single direction to the centre of its sphere).
In both cases, conatus is part of the explanation of how bodies behave in relation to their
intrinsic motive tendencies. What changes – and dramatically – is the consideration of what an
intrinsic motive tendency is, and therefore which forces are to be taken as indicative of this intrin-
sic motive tendency. In the Aristotelian framework, the gravitational attraction exerted by the
earth’s mass for bodies near its surface is interpreted as due to the natural tendency of bodies
to move towards the centre of their sphere. When I hold a heavy body in my hand, I perceive
a force that pushes downwards because the body strives to move naturally towards the centre
of its sphere. On the contrary, in Descartes’s account the experience that can actually display
the intrinsic motive tendency of bodies is that of a projectile rotating in a sling. If I release the
projectile, it continues its motion rectilinearly and tangentially to the circle that it describes,
and not circularly. The centrifugal force I perceive when I rotate a projectile in a sling is given
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because the projectile strives to move rectilinearly, that is, according to the motion that God
imparts to it with his ordinary concourse.
However, these similarities rest on a general conception of nature that is dramatically, or
better, paradigmatically, changed. In this respect, an important part of Descartes’s work consisted
in the redefinition of a whole arsenal of Scholastic concepts to fit his new mechanistic framework,
and the reworking of the concept of conatus that I have laid out here was central to this
transformation.
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Notes
1. Descartes, Principles of Philosophy, 39, 240–1; Latin taken from Descartes, Principia Philosophiae, in
Oeuvres, 63.
2. Descartes,Oeuvres, 112: “unusquisque satis magna vi recedere conetur a centro vorticis in quo gyratur:
retinetur enim hinc inde ab aliis globulis circompositis, non aliter quam lapis a funda” (my translation).
3. In defining a body’s motive tendency as “intrinsic”, I do not imply that for Descartes motion is a prop-
erty of things. For, as I better show later, according to Descartes it depends on God’s action only.
However, there is no doubt that Descartes considers rectilinear motion as the kinetic state that a
body has quantum in se est, that is, independently from any external constraint or hindrance. It is in
this sense that I use the expression “intrinsic motive tendency” or equivalent variants.
4. See Gaukroger, Descartes’s System of Natural Philosophy, 108.
5. In his book The Mechanization of Aristotelianism, Cees Leijenhorst connects Hobbes’s conception of
conatus with its use in late-Scholasticism: “Hobbes’ reinterpretation of the Aristotelian concept of
conatus is another expression of his ‘continental’ rejection of active forces and inner potentialities.
Although rejecting the scholastic theory of gravity and free fall, he retained the concept of gravity
as an inclination, a striving, or what the scholastics call a conatus. His only quibble concerned the
way scholastics defined the term. According to Hobbes, conatus cannot be an intrinsic, non-kinematic
principle by which bodies move themselves. In his mechanism, all physical action is local action. This,
if conatus is indeed physical action, it must be motion. It cannot be a mere potentiality to move, as the
scholastics had it. In Hobbes’ view, conatus is not an appetite to move, but actually motion itself.”
Leijenhorst, The Mechanisation of Aristotelianism, 196.
6. Aristotle, Physics, 10–21, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, 92.
7. For an account of the Scholastic theory of motion, see Maier, Studien Zur Naturphilosophie Der
Spätscholastik.
8. Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles, 2 http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/scg2046.html (accessed 24
May 2013): “Inest enim omnibus appetitus boni: cum bonum sit quod omnia appetunt, ut philosophi
tradunt. Huiusmodi autem appetitus in his quidem quae cognitione carent, dicitur naturalis appetitus:
sicut dicitur quod lapis appetit esse deorsum. In his autem quae cognitionem sensitivam habent, dicitur
appetitus animalis, qui dividitur in concupiscibilem et irascibilem. In his vero quae intelligunt, dicitur
appetitus intellectualis seu rationalis, qui est voluntas.”
9. Goclenius, Lexicon Philosophicum, 114: “Distinctio ambigae verbi naturae. Appetitus ὁμονύμω
dicitur: In igne ad occupanda loca superiora:in ferro ad sui conjunctionem cum magnete: in planta
ad humore sugendum: in equo ad Venerem: in homine ad beatitudinem.”
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10. Ibid., 115: “qui dicitur quodammodo improprie appetitus,” “that is somewhat improperly called aid
somewhat inappropriately appetite”, (my translation).
11. Ibid.: “in stirpe, quae attrahit & appetit alimentum absque sensu [… ].”
12. Ibid.:“In inanimis, ut magnete”.
13. Buonamici, De Motu, 392:“Ergo appetitus definitio talis afferri poterit, inclinatio necessaria ex natura
cuiusq. rei ad bonum sibi coveniens secundum naturam”.
14. See Vitelleschi, Lectiones R. P. Mutii Vitelleschi in octo libros.
15. Wallace, Prelude to Galileo, 116.
16. Conimbricenses, Commentari in Octo Libros, V.6, Explanatio, 202 (my translation): “quandoquidem
lapis externa vi sursum propellitur, reluctatur ascensui eius forma naturali conatu, & impulsu, quod
deorsum nititur; sed etiam aqua ab igne calefit, eius forma calefactioni active repugnat, per ingenitam
ad frigus inclinationem, et quantum potest frigum suum active conservando, et in igne.”
17. Eustachius, Summa, P.3, P2, Q6, 121 (my translation): “Corpora gravia supra levia, aut graviora supra
minus gravia ubicunque sint gravitant: similiter levia infra gravia, aut leviora infra minus levia levitant.
Cujus assertionis veritas experientia constat: ubicunque enim gravia ponuntur, confestim superiorem
locum levibus aut minus gravibus, si haec infra sint, deferuntur, quod non sit, nisi mutuo gravium des-
cendentium, levium ascendentium conatu, qui gravitandi et levitandi actu nuncupantur.”
18. Buonamici, De motu, V.35, 503: “Ideo quod unumquodque suae neci resistit, quantum potest; tantum
abest ut eo properet, ut nisi virtus moventis resistentiam mobilis superet nunquam moveatur; et nisi
prevaleat facultas violans, in pristinum locum semper retrocedat; neque ullo modo conatum moventis
adiuvat, sicut adjuvaret saxum, si magno impeto deiicerunt [… ].”
19. See for instance Roux, “La Philosophie Naturelle,” 75–94, and Palmerino, “Two Jesuit Responses to
Galileo’s Science of Motion,” 181–227.
20. Fabri, Tractatus physicus, 417, (my translation): “Decimò, cum manus ſuſtinet aliquod pondus immo-
biliter, non producit in eo impetum.”
21. Ibid.: “Respondeo omnem impetum non esse frustrà, licèt careat motu, vt patet in ipso impetu innato,
cuius duplex est effectum; scilicet grauitatio, & motus, vt aliàs iam indicauimus; similiter impetus pro-
ductus à potentia motrice, [… ] potest duplicem effectum; primus est motus; secundus est nisus seu
conatus oppositus extrinseco motui; [… ] enim innatus semper habet motum, nisi impediatur ab
alio corpore [… ].”
22. degli Angeli, Della Gravità, 10 (my translation): “Vna portione di quest’acqua, ò aria sia resa per
qualche accidente vn pochino meno densa, e graue, sìche il suo conato al discendere ceda in parte;
vederà, che subito sarà spinta in sù da quell’altr’aria, ò acqua, la quale essendo inalterata, conserua
il medemo conato, il quale eccede quello della rarefatta. [… ].”
23. Borelli, De motionibus naturalibus, (Cap. 1, supp. II, 11 ( my translation): “Secundo loco suppono
vim, seù conatum, quo fluida nituntur sese vnire sphæræ terraqueæ, effici per lineas erectae ab super-
ficiem horizontis. & hoc patet quia quodlibet graueis naturali instinctu conatur ad centrum terræ acce-
dere via breuissima, igitur directio prædicti motus, seù conatus compressiuus efficietur per
semidiametros eiusdem terræ, hæ verò erectae sunt ab superficiem horizontalem, quæ sphæricè
ipsam terram comprehendit, igitur manifestum eſt quòd motus seù conatus compressiuus omnium
partium fluidi per lineas ab horizontem perpendiculares efficitur.”
24. For instance, there is no mention of the conatus in Averroes (Aristotelis Libri Physicorum 8) Buridan
(Subtilissimae Quaestiones Super Octo Physicorum Libros Aristotelis), Nicolaus Oresme (Nicolaus
Oresmes Kommentar Zur Physik Des Aristoteles,) or Duns Scotus (In VIII. Libros Physicorum Aris-
totelis Expositio et Quaestiones.)
25. There is no explicit use of the concept in Toletus (Francisci Toleti Commentaria) nor in the Complu-
tenses commentaries on Aristotle’s Physics (Disputationes in Octo Libros Physicorum Aristotelis.)
26. For instance, there is no mention of this specific use of the concept in Borro (De Motu Grauium, &
Leuium) in Cardano (Opus novum de proportionibus) Giovanni-Battista Benedetti (Diversarum Spec-
ulationum Mathematicarum), Galileo Galilei’s De motu antiquiora, Giovanni Battista Baliani (De
Motu Naturali Gravium Solidorum,) or Andreas van Berlicom (Elementorum de rervm natvralivm
gravitate).
27. Descartes, Correspondence, 185.
28. Des Chene, “Descartes and the Natural Philosophy of the Coimbra Commentaries,” In Descartes’s
Natural Philosophy, edited by Stephen Gaukroger, John Schuster, and John Sutton, London: Routle-
dge, 2000, 29: “Descartes mentions the commentaries of the Coimbrans only twice in his correspon-
dence. In 1640, anticipating objections by the Jesuits to the Meditationes, and having some desire ‘to
re-read a bit of their Philosophy’, he asks Mersenne to send him the names of the authors ‘whom they
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follow most closely’. Wondering whether anything new has appeared in the last twenty years, Des-
cartes adds that he recalls ‘only the Coimbrans, Toletus, and Rubius’; he also remembers, but not
by name, ‘a Chartreuse or Feuillant’ who wrote an abrégé of ‘the whole School Philosophy’. That
author turned out to be Eustachius a Sancto Paulo, and it was to Eustachius’ Summa quadripartita,
which is indeed a greatly condensed compilation of other philosophers’ works, that he eventually
turned.”
29. Ariew, Descartes among the Scholastics, 43–4.
30. See Descartes, Correspondence, 232: “J’ay achepté la Philosophie du frere Eust. à sacto P., qui me
semble le meilleur livre qui ait iamais esté fait en cette matiere; ie seray bien aise de sçavoir si l’autheur
vit encore’ and ibid., 233: ‘Et mon desire est d’écrire par ordre tout un Cours de ma Philosophie en
forme de Theses [… ]; & au mesme livre, de faire imprimer un Course de la Philosophie Ordinaire,
tel que peut estre celuy du Frere Eustache, avec mes Notes à la fin de chaque question, où iìadjousteray
les diverses opinions des autres, & ce qu’on doit croire de toutes, & peut-estre ò la fin ie feray une
comparaison de ces deux Philosophies.”
31. On this, see Van De Pitte, “Some of Descartes’s Debts.”
32. Descartes, Oeuvres, 183.
33. Ibid., 36, 240.
34. Ibid., 35, 240–241.
35. However, Stephen Gaukroger (has underlined that there are at least two passages in which Descartes
seems to admit circular inertia (Gaukroger, “The Foundational Role of Hydrostatics and Statics”, 60–
1). Gaukroger attributes this apparent contradiction to a “structural ambiguity” of Descartes account of
motion, due to the fact that “Descartes models his kinematics on statics, and particularly on hydrostat-
ics.” (ibid. 62).
36. Descartes, Principles of Philosophy, 241; Latin from Oeuvres, 63.
37. The Cartesian concept of resistance has been regarded by scholars as intimately connected to that of
conatus. Since the treatment of this connection goes beyond the goal of this paper, I limit myself to
recall the account of resistance as active persistence provided by Dennis Des Chene. Accordingly,
“In Descartes’s thinking [… ] persistence can be regarded under a negative or a positive aspect. Nega-
tive persistence is the permanence of a state in the absence of external causes. I will call this simply
persistence. [… ] Positive persistence is the permanence, or the tendency to permanence, of a state,
in the face of external causes. This I will call resistance. Although Descartes’s first law asserts only
that a thing will persist, in his second and third laws it is clear that a thing will also resist certain
kinds of external cause. Resistance [… ] was construed by some authors to be passive, by others as
active, or, more specifically, reactive. That ambiguity remains in Descartes’s physics, and [… ] its
underground survival helps to explain why he formulated the rules of collision so as to created a
marked asymmetry between motion and rest.(see Des Chene, Physiologia, 273–74)” Nevertheless,
it is worthy to note that here in The World, differently from the Principles, the resistance is merely
understood as the external constraint that prevents the actual rectilinear movement of the body (for
instance, the sling for what concerns the stone or the corpuscles or the other parts of heaven for
what concerns the corpuscles of the second element rotating around the centre of their vortex.)
38. Descartes, Le Monde, 146–7.
39. Ibid., 151 (emphasis added).
40. The meaning of the concept of force in Descartes is a point of contention among scholar. The dispute
concerns in particular the relation between force and bodies. Indeed, some scholars (see for instance,
Gueroult and Gabbey in Gaukroger, Descartes: Philosophy, Mathematics and Physics) have claimed
that force is to be understood as an actual property contained in bodies, whereas others have seen it as a
consequence of the action of God on matter. For instance, Daniel Garber claims that “the force Des-
cartes appeals to in Law 3, and the tendency a body has to persevere in its state derive from God, from
the immutable way in which he sustains the world he creates, in particular, from the way in which he
sustains the body in motion in that world. In this way force is not in bodies themselves. (see Garber,
“Descartes’s Physics,” 320.)”
41. Descartes, Principles of Philosophy, 242.
42. Descartes, Oeuvres, 64: “Lapis A, in funda EA per circulum ABF rotatus, eo instanti, quo est in puncto
A, determinatus quidem est ad motum versus aliquam partem, nempe secundam lineam rectam versus
C, ita scilicet ut linea recta AC sit tangens circuli. Non autem fingi potest illum determinatum esse ad
ullum motum curvum: etsi enim prius venerit ex L ad A per lineam curvam, nihil tamen istius curvitatis
intelligi potest in eo remanere, dum est in puncto A. Hocque etiam experientia confirmatur, quia si tunc
e funda egreditur, non perget moveri versus B, sed versus C. Ex quo sequitur, omne corpus quod
492 R. GARAU
circulariter movetur, perpetuo tendere ut recedat a centro circuli quem describit. (My translation).” NB
The standard English edition of the Principles does not provide a full translation of the text. Therefore,
I will supply my own translations from the Latin when it is necessary, providing the original passage in
the notes.
43. See McLaughlin, “Force, Determination, and Impact,” 85–6.
44. Descartes, Principles of Philosophy, 248.
45. Descartes, The World, 59, (my italics).
46. Ibid., 59–61.
47. Ibid., 75, (my emphasis).
48. Ibid.
49. Descartes, Principles of Philosophy, 260.
50. Descartes, Oeuvres, 109 (my translation. Emphasis added).
51. Ibid., 111: “primo quidem temporis momento, quo iste canalis agetur in gyro circa centrum E, globulus
A motu tantum tardissimo progredietur versus Y; sed secundo momento paulo celerius incedet:
priorem enim vim retinebit, ac praeterea novam acquiret a novo conatu recedendi a centro E [… ],
(my translation).”
52. Ibid., 112: “ista tensio, a sola vi qua lapis recedere conatur a centro sui motus exorta, exhibet nobis
istius vis quantitatem,” (my translation).
53. Descartes, Principles of Philosophy, 259; Descartes, Oeuvres, 108.
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